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"SDRs" -A Sui Generis Concept in
International Monetary Lawf
A new kind of money, to be used only by Central Banks, has been
"activated" by the International Monetary Fund at its meeting in Washing-
ton the week of September 29, 1969. The activation was through author-
izing an issue in 1970 of $3.5 billion of Special Drawing Rights, SDRs,
followed by additional issues of $3 billion in each of 1971 and 1972,
making a total of $9.5 billion. If this "paper gold", really serves the same
purpose as real gold in providing monetary liquidity sufficient for ex-
panding world commerce, and substitutes for the excess of the spending
abroad by the U.S.A. over its foreign income, the Fund may vote further
issues. However, it should be kept in mind that as deficits in one country
are offset by surpluses in other countries, theoretically only half the alloca-
tions, i.e., those made to deficit countries, can be used at one time. Hence
the effectiveness of these allocations would ostensibly be cut in half.
The Department of Commerce recently announced that as of June 30,
1969, the United States had reached a surplus of $1.2 billion in its balance
of payments computed on the official settlements basis. Dr. Rinaldo Os-
sola, the Chairman of the Committee of Deputies of the Finance Min-
isteries and Governors of Central Banks of the group of Ten and Economic
Counsellor of the Bank of Italy, says that official settlements would be the
basis used for determining whether a deficit exists for the purposes of
SDRs. In contrast, on a liquidity basis there was a deficit of $3.8 bil-
lion-about the same as past deficits.
These Special Drawing Rights, which are exercised against the surpluses
or unused monetary reserves of other members-as contrasted with mem-
bers' ordinary drawing rights against their own subscriptions in gold or
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currencies in the Fund itself, were created by amendments adopted at Rio
de Janeiro in 1968 to the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 which estab-
lished the IMF.
These amendments attribute to a right the gold value of the U. S. dollar
envisaged by the 1944 agreement, i.e., each right is a unit of value equiva-
lent to 0.888671 of a grain of pure gold. They are distributed in accordance
with agreed quotas ranging from a fraction of 1% (e.g., Luxembourg with
0.1%) up to the U. S. quota of 24.3%. Actually they have no intrinsic value
and are represented merely by debits and credits in a "special drawing
account" maintained at the head office of the Fund in Washington.
SDRs will be issued to all of the members of the Fund in the agreed
percentages, which are the same as those determining their respective
subscriptions to the Fund. They are to be exercised, subject to the guid-
ance of the management of the Fund, by a country with a "balance of
payments need" through presenting them to the Central Bank of a country
with a surplus in its balance of payments, or otherwise with more monetary
reserves (in gold, dollars, or possibly pounds, francs or currencies of other
countries) than are required to back its own currency.
Countries with surpluses are, for example, Germany, with a quota of
5.7%, and Italy with 2.9%. A central bank, to which a fellow member's
SDRs are presented, is committed by the agreement to deliver in exchange
its currency or the currency of another country, such as dollars. If it has a
sufficient surplus and reserves it may purchase up to three times the
amount of its own quota of SDRs. These rights are considered to be worth
an amount equal to their face value of the purchasing country's own
currency or foreign exchange. The SDRs so purchased are included as an
"asset" in its monetary reserves along with gold and dollars or other
foreign exchange.
SDRs are called an "asset" despite the fact that they have been ex-
changed for currency that has been taken out of surplus country's stock of
money and transferred to the deficit country.
According to Mr. Joseph Gold,** the General Counsel for the Fund, the
country with a "balance of payment need" which has received the dollars
or other foreign exchange is not regarded as a debtor or the recipient of a
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loan. Instead, said country is committed to reconstitute its holdings of
SDRs by the end of five years after an allocation, so that its average
holdings over the preceding five years will not be less than 30% of its net
accumulations of SDRs over the same period. In other words, it can leave
70% of its SDRs in the hands of the Central Bank or Banks whose
currency it has bought.
It is therefore not astonishing that Mr. Gold describes the way SDRs
are used as sui generis financial transactions between central banks which
cannot be compared with any ordinary banking practice. The same thing,
he declares, may be said about the use of ordinary drawing rights against
the Fund itself, namely, a member's right to "purchase from the IMF
foreign exchange with its own currency subject to reversing the transaction
by repurchasing from the Fund its own currency with gold or convertible
foreign exchange". The same is true of the Fund's sale of said member's
currency to other members. In certain circumstances, a member must
repurchase from the Fund its own currency which it has sold to the Fund,
in any event within three to five years, in accordance with policies evolved
by the Fund.
SDRs Evidenced by Debits and Credits
As has been stated, SDRs are represented by the entry of debits and
credits in a special drawing account maintained at the office of the IMF in
Washington, but are given by the amendments the gold value of the U.S.
dollar recognized in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. They are
intended to be a substitute for the dollars that will cease to flow into the
world economy when the United States obviates a deficit by limiting the
amount of its spending of dollars abroad to the amount of dollars it takes
in.
Value is given to the new drawing rights, which are described as "spe-
cial," because they are exchanged directly for the surplus cash of a mem-
ber instead of for gold or currencies contributed to the Fund. The amend-
ments not only attribute to an SDR the gold value of the dollar, but they
envisage that SDRs will be limited in number to the amount considered
necessary, at the time of the issue, to assure the liquidity required for the
growth of world commerce. In this regard they are reminiscent of the
money of Sparta several centuries BC which consisted of iron coins. They
had no intrinsic value but were accepted at their face value because they
were listed in number.
The SDRs are limited-$3.5 billion in 1970 and $3 billion in each of
1971 and 1972-and the gold value of the dollar is ascribed to them.
However, what actually gives them value is the fact that a country with a
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surplus or reserves that are higher than needed must exchange for the
SDRs presented to it by another member an equivalent amount of cur-
rency, which in turn is backed by gold and foreign exchange, including
dollars. Hence, though merely a new concept represented by three words
"special drawing rights" and entries in a special account at the IMF, they
acquire in effect the real value of the gold and dollars or other foreign
exchange, perhaps pounds or francs, which make up the reserves backing
the currency for which they are exchanged.
After After World War 11, the destroyed factories of Europe could not
produce enough goods to sell to the U.S.A. to acquire the dollars which
they needed to buy urgently needed supplies from the United States. This
"dollar gap" led to the Marshall Plan and the outpouring of dollars that
could not be covered by receipts from the sale of goods and returns from
investments abroad and capital invested by foreigners in the United States.
Can SDRs Prevent a "Dollar Gap"?
Regardless of how much foreign monetary authorities may have chided
the United States for not balancing its international accounts, the world
economy benefited from the infusion of dollars. Apprehension over what
might happen if the restrictions on capital outflow imposed in 1968 were
successful in balancing the U.S. international payments caused the Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten-the strongest
countries financially-to seek an "asset" which could be added to mone-
tary reserves of central banks and provide the liquidity that would other-
wise diminish progressively with the curtailment of the U.S. deficit.
It is manifest that SDRs are merely a device whereby a country that is
short of cash can obtain it from another with a surplus. They do not add to
the total supply of currencies, nor to the approximately $40 billion of gold
in monetary reserves or the amount of dollars or of foreign exchange that
back the currencies of members.
A member must maintain over a five-year period an average of only 30%
of the SDRs that have been allocated to it. It can leave 70% outstanding in
the hands of other central banks. However, these merely reflect the trans-
actions in currencies that have been bought by holders of SDRs and used
for their respective purposes. They have not added to the total supply of
money but have provided a means for transferring money, that might
otherwise lie idle as reserves, to another country where it can be used.
Dr. Ossola describes this as being "expansionary" rather than
inflationary. The use of money is increased without augmenting its quan-
tity.
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Operations in SDRs Not Loans
SDRs may be used by a participating government (e.g., the U.S.A.) to
meet the "needs of its balance of payments or reserves". Mr. Gold states
that operations in SDRs are not loans, legally speaking, but are the ex-
change of one reserve asset, i.e., SDRs, for another reserve asset, i.e.,
foreign exchange.
SDRs are not subject to the Fund's ordinary requirements and policies
which apply in the case of a member's purchase, and repurchase after a
sale, of foreign exchange from the Fund. Instead, members which have
sold their allocations of SDRs to other members under the guidance of the
Fund must "reconstitute" their holdings of said rights by the end of five
years after the first allocation. At the end of each calendar quarter there-
after, the participant's average holdings over the preceding five-year period
must not be less than 30% of its net cumulative allocations of SDRs during
the same period.
If, for example, the U.S.A. sells its SDRs to Germany in exchange for
Dmarks, this does not give rise to a loan of Dmarks by Germany to the
U.S.A. This country would not have to repay Germany for the Dmarks so
obtained as would occur if it borrowed them under a loan agreement.
Instead, Germany may use the SDRs received from the U.S.A. in transac-
tions with other participants when it needs foreign exchange, or effects
certain transactions with the Fund. The U.S. must reconstitute or buy back
only 30% of its SDRs, as has been described supra.
SDRs Considered to be Assets in Monetary Reserves
The amendments to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 on SDRs
are being activated by the vote of the IMF Assembly at the meeting at
Washington at the end of September, 1969. Each allocation of SDRs is
apportioned among the 112 members in accordance with their respective
quotas, for example, the U.S. 24.3%, the U.K. 11.5%, France 4.6%,
Germany 5.7%, Italy 2.9%, Netherlands 2.4%, Belgium 2%, Luxembourg
0.1%.
Central banks maintain their monetary reserves in gold, dollars and
foreign exchange, SDRs are considered to be a reserve asset guaranteed as
to gold value, i.e., each is a unit of value equivalent to 0.88867 1 of a grain
of fine gold. This was the gold content of the U.S. dollar of the weight and
fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, and is still in effect, under the Bretton
Woods Agreement, which entered into force on December 27, 1945, and is
being amended by the provisions on SDRs. The United States buys and
sells gold at $35 an ounce, and this determines the value of the dollar for
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the purposes of the international monetary system and SDRs.
The monetary gold held by central banks amounts to around $40 billion
and this is supplemented by holdings of U.S. dollars, U.K. pounds, French
francs or other foreign exchange. The 112 members of the IMF have,
through adopting the new amendments, accepted the SDRs as a means of
payment to be used only by central banks. Thus by collective action they
have provided a new "asset" to supplement monetary reserves.
Obviously they do not add anything quantitatively to existing monetary
reserves in gold and foreign exchange. However, they do provide a facility
for taking away from countries which have a surplus in their balance of
payments, or reserves that are stronger than necessary, and for transferring
this amount to countries which have a deficit or depleted reserves.
An official of the Fund has explained that a participating country with a
"balance of payments need" such as that of financing a deficit, may ask the
Fund to designate another participating country with a sufficiently strong
balance of payments and reserve position to accept the former's SDRs in
exchange for its currency or dollars or the currency of a third country.
Before allocating a new issue of SDRs in accordance with agreed per-
centages to the 112 members, the Fund must be satisfied that the addition
to the existing reserve assets in this fashion will promote the attainment of
the purposes of the Fund and will avoid economic stagnation and deflation
or, on the other hand, excess demand and inflation in the world. Mr. Gold
asserts that the deliberate control of international liquidity on the basis of
collective international judgment holds out the best hope for avoiding a
repetition of the recession of the 1930s.
Conclusion
SDRs have been given by treaty a gold value. They are to be exchanged
for currencies backed by monetary reserves consisting of gold, and also
dollars and other foreign monies, which in turn are to varying degrees
based on gold, an ounce of which is valued at $35.
SDRs have been devised as a substitute for the infusion of dollars that
results from the deficitary spending abroad by the United States. Will they
add enough to provide the money needed to carry on international trade?
Countries short of cash because of a deficit in their balance of payments
can obtain unconditionally currency from more prosperous nations up to
the face value of the SDRs, to use in financing imports or otherwise to
apply against their deficit. They can spend 100% of their respective alloca-
tion of SDRs, but have to "reconstitute," or buy back, only a prescribed
30%. Countries with a surplus may buy SDRs from other countries with
balance of payments needs and pay out currencies up to three times the
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face value of their own quota. The crucial question is whether this method
of mobilizing otherwise idle funds will provide the liquidity needed to
develop the full potential of world commerce. This question is pertinent
when consideration is given to the fact that apparently France would be
entitled to SDRs with a face value of only $158 million out of the first issue
of $3.5 billion, yet its government has recently had to obtain from the IMF
credits amounting to $2 billion to meet its needs after the recent devalua-
tion.
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